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NATURE OF THE CASE 
An accident occurred involving a Hagen Trucking rig 
carrying primal cuts of meat. 't'his suit seeks damages for the 
Weber County Sher if f department's order disposing of the meat 
which Hagen claims was salvageable. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found the defendants negligent in the destruc-
tion of the cargo and returned a verdict in the amount of 
$19,377 of the approximately $60,000 value of the meat before 
the accident. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to have the case remanded for 
further proceedings on the issue of damages. If the case is 
remanded for further proceedings on the issue of damages, the 
respondent seeks an instruction allowing greater damages. 
Appellants notice of appeal indicated that additional relief was 
sought on other issues. Since these have not been addressed in 
the appellants' brief they will be considered abandoned and not 
be treated herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant has relayed the facts in the light most 
favorable to it when in actuality, the facts should be stated in 
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the light most favorable to the respondent. ~he facts relevant 
to the appeal are very few. The appellant spends a page and a 
half quoting the fire mar shall' s observations of the fire and 
that "some" and later "a lot" and still later "the majority" of 
the meat had been burned. Respondent will avoid the temptation 
to rebute this or restate other facts which are more- favorable 
since none of these facts are relevant to the appeal. Suffice it 
to say there was considerable evidence showing that the county 
personnel were exagerating the extent of the fire damage, that 
this evidence was believed by the jury, and that no appeal of it 
has been taken. This appeal is taken on a very narrow issue -
whether there is any evidence that the meat individually 
inspected by the respondent's recovery expert at the dump " ••• 
bears any resemblance to the part that he did not inspect .••• " 
(Appellant's brief at 9.) As such, respondent will add some 
additional background and then add additional facts relevant to 
the appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
The meat involved in the accident was vacuum packed in a 
three-ply plastic container that was impervious to diesel fuel. 
Unless punctured the meat could be repackaged and consummed. 
Punctures might necessitate trimming but would not necessarily 
ruin the product. The meat was in turn packed in cardboard 
boxes, approximately two to a box. 
- 2 -
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Former Deputy Sheriff Schlosser arrived at the scene and 
was put in charge of the investigation. Schlosser, after con-
sultation with others, decided between 6:00 and 6:30, at a time 
which he was not even sure what the cargo was, to have it hauled 
to the dump where it was placed in a trench with dead animals and 
other refuse. The county road crews came with front end 
loaders, scooped the cargo up, dumped it into trucks, then hauled 
it to the dump where it was dropped in the trench, thus further 
damaging the product. Once placed in the dump with dead animals, 
the USDA Inspectors would not allow consumption of the meat. 
Former Deputy Schlosser admitted he had a duty to contact the 
truck company before disposing of the cargo, if possible, yet did 
not despite evidence that he knew the company's identification. 
It was shown that in an accident of this type the 
trucking company would send recovery crews by private jet who, 
under supervision of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Meat Inspection Division (MID), would recover the meat. To the 
extent necessary the company and MID would unpackage, trim, test 
and repackage the product. The product no longer fit for human 
consumption is used in pet food and even that which is burned, 
charred or soaked in diesel has some value as "tankage" which is 
used in fertilizers and other non-edible products. 
The damage evidence showed that various percentages of 
the meat could have been recovered for human consumption, pet 
- 3 -
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food, and "tankage," or non-edible uses. Evidence also showed 
the cost of this recovery, the value of the meat in those three 
categories, the recovery methods, the trimming procedures, the 
USDA inspection requirements, the value loss due to shorter shelf 
life, the effects of rancidity, putrification, and aging, that 
one average piece of meat was removed from the dump, tested and 
found to be very edible, and other factors necessary for the jury 
to properly determine damages. ~hese are not contested by 
appellant, however, and need no further detail. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL. 
Evidence directly relating to the appellants' argument 
is in reality a question of whether the 150 to 200 packages indi-
vidually inspected by Mr. Hicks was a fair sampling of the load. 
The facts relating to this question quoted by appellant can be 
summarized as follows: 
Mr. Hicks made a "general inspection" of the 
meat and then pulled some boxes out of the 
dump and inspected the meat inside them. As 
it was getting dark he left and returned the 
next morning. TJpon arrival he made a "full 
visual inspection," "went from one end of it 
[the meatJ to the other" and "rummaged" 
through the meat. Mr. Hicks testified that 
". . . t got down and dug through the stuff, 
and this is where I inspected the approxima-
tely 150 to 200 pieces of meat, moving about 
by hand." (R. 97-98; 101-102) 
In addition to the above testimony quoted by appellant, 
Mr. Hicks testified in response to a question of what kind of 
- 4 -
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cuts of meat he inspected in the trench, that "it was a cross-
section of what was there," (R. 116) and that even after the 
accident, the fire, and the handling and dumping by county road 
crews, some of the boxes were still intact with meat inside, 
though the boxes were crumpled. (R. 98) 
The photos taken both at the scene and at the qump show 
unburned boxes still in tact, let alone meat still in the plastic 
wrapper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VERDICT RENDERED BY THE JURY WAS BASED ON FACT 
AND REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM FACT AS ALLOWED BY LAW. 
A. The appellant's burden On this appeal. 
The appellant's burden on this appeal is substantial. 
It is a time honored rule that a jury's finding of facts will not 
be overturned unless they are entirely without foundation in the 
evidence and so unsubstantial that no reasonable mind could have 
so concluded. This court stated in Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975): 
We frequently declare our comrni ttment to the 
jury system, under which it is the perogative 
of lay citizens to determine questions of 
fact, both as to liability and the fixing of 
damages; and in cases of this character their 
varied experiences and their closeness to the 
reality of everyday affairs qualify them to 
fix damages as well as or perhaps better than 
judges. The court should give the jury system 
more than lip service, by honoring the jury's 
perogatives; and by declining to interfere 
therewith unless the determinations made are 
- 5 -
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entirely without foundation and evidence, or 
are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no 
reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence 
could have so concluded. In addition to what 
has been said concerning the fact that the 
jury seems to have sensed what had occurred 
and to have done justice concerning it, the 
trial court also indicated his approval by 
refusing to interfere with the verdict or to 
grant a new trial. 
Prince, supra at 1329. 
Both the jury and the trial judge have made a similar 
determination in this case. The plaintiff must show not merely 
that a reasonable person might disagree, or that some reasonable 
persons might disagree, but that all reasonable minds would 
disagree with the jury's verdict. 
". . • we would not reverse and compel a 
finding in accordance with that contention 
unless the evidence were such that all reaso-
nable minds would necessarily so find. 
Conversely, if there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence, or from lack of evidence, upon 
which reasonable minds could remain uncon-
vinced, we would not disturb the ruling of 
the trial court. Centurian Corporation v. 
Fiberchem Incorporated, 562 P. 2d 1252 at 
1253, (Utah 1977) (emphasis added.) 
Not only must the appellant show that all reasonable 
minds would disagree with the jury's verdict, it must also show 
that the error was substantial and prejudicial. 't'his court 
stated in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.id 602 (Utah 1974): 
This court has previously stated that in any 
lawsuit of several days duration, counsel can 
usually find matters upon which he may claim 
error, but this court will not reverse on mere 
error but only if it be substantial and preju-
- 6 -
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dicial to the extent that there is a reaso-
nable likelihood that unfairness or injustice 
has resulted. 
Lamb, supra at 610. 
With this burden in mind we should examine the error 
claimed to have been found in the trial. 
B. Appellants claimed "missing link" is a desire to 
verbalize the obvious, and is a reasonable inference from the 
evidence. 
It first is important to realize what the appellant is 
not arguing. Appellant does not contest liability. Nor does it 
contest that a portion of the cargo could have been salvaged and 
that some damages have justifiably been assessed5 Appellant only 
contests that the amount of the damages is too large. Appellant 
contests the amount of damages on one narrow point--that the evi-
dence does not support the amount of damages because there is 
"absolutely no evidence" that the sampling Mr. Hicks made bore 
any resemblance to the meat not individually sampled. The 
appellant had a fair trial and the verdict of the jury rests 
soundly on the evidence and should not be disturbed. 
1. Findings of Fact are to be Based on Evidence 
and Reasonable Inferences Therefrom. 
~ppellant is in error because its argument assumes 
that every minor point must be verbalized and that reasonable 
inferences are not part of the evidence. To the contrary, fact 
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findings are based upon both verbalized evidence and reasonable 
inferences from that evidence. Lym v. Thompson is one of the 
early Utah cases dealing with inferences. In Lym, there was some 
steel tubing which was unaccounted for. No one actually saw 
anyone take the tubing but circumstantial evidence pointed to the 
defendant in this civil action. The lower qourt found for the 
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. ~his court stated: 
We are called upon to decide whether or not 
there is evidence in the case that will 
directly or by inference support the decision 
of the trier of the facts. In deciding that 
question we decide merely--so far as cir-
cumstantial evidence is concerned--that if 
there are inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that will support the lower court's conclu-
sions upon the probabilities of that evidence, 
we are bound to uphold the decision, even 
though had we been trying the case we might 
have stressed the inferences adversely to such 
a conclusion. 
Lym v. Thompson, 184 P.2d 667 at 669 (Utah 1947). 
More recently, Morris v. Farmer's Home Mutual, 500 P.2d 
505, (Utah 1972), dealt with an appeal of a finding that flood 
water came from a plumbing fixture in the basement rather than 
from outside the house. The defendant appealed because no one 
actually saw where the water came from and thus claimed there was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict. ~his court stated: 
The nature of the world about us and the 
goings on therein are such that we witness 
only a small percentage of it by direct obser-
vation. A large portion of our awareness and 
knowledge is necessarily derived f ram deduc-
t ions based upon our observations of existing 
- 8 -
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facts and circumstances. It is important to 
apply this principle to the perogative of the 
court as the fact trier. He is entitled to 
make his findings of fact not only on evidence 
concerning direct observations, but also to 
draw whatever inferences a person of ordinary 
intelligence and experience could fairly and 
reasonably draw therefrom. 
Morris, supra at 507. 
'l'he case at bar goes one step further. tt is as if 
someone actually observed some of the water in Morris coming into 
the basement from a plumbing fixture and then left, only to 
return and find additional water. Appellant now argues that 
damages can only be assessed for the amount of water which was 
actually observed coming into the basement and claims it is pure 
speculation as to the source of the remaining water since no one 
saw it. Mr. Hicks made a "full visual inspection" of all the 
meat then actually examined 150 to 200 individual pieces. It is 
~ 
a natural and reasonable inference that those individually exa-
mined were generally representative of the whole. Especially in 
light of Mr. Hicks testimony that he "dug through" the meat, went 
from "end to end" and saw a "cross-section" of meat cuts. 
The arguments of the appellant really go the weight of 
the evidence. Appellant in ef feet complains about the sample 
size and would have had Mr. Hicks inspect every package. The 
appellant alludes to this in saying "The fact that he chose to 
inspect only 150 to 200 packages of meat was his own decision." 
(Appellant's brief at 13.) ~ppellant can cross examine and 
- 9 -
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argue to the jury that the sample size was not large enough to 
accurately portray the damage to the entire load, but it is a 
question of fact for the jury to determine. 
In reality Mr. Hicks could not have said much more than 
he did i.e. that he dug down through them, went through one end 
of the trench to the other, etc. Had he said what appellant now 
claims is the missing link, i.e. that the packages he did inspect 
resembled those he did not, he would have little basis for any 
such statement. Mr. ~icks could not say that the pieces that he 
personally inspected were similar to those he did not personally 
inspect without personally inspecting the remainder. Mr. Hicks 
would have had to inspect each piece to draw that conclusion. 
That, however, is unnecessary. ~he inference is there. 
The weight given to that inference could have been and was sub-
ject to cross-examination and other testimony as to the percent 
salvageable in the separate categories. But the strength of 
those inferences is the basis of final argument, not an appeal. 
Appellant bases its appeal on the quest for a verbalization of an 
obvious inference. That verbalization is not necessary. 
~inally, The Corporation Of the President Of the Church 
Of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, 467 P.2d 984 
(Utah 1970), involved a similar issue on appeal. tn that case, a 
verdict was entered for the plaintiff imposing a constructive 
trust on two automobiles purchased at least in part by embezzled 
- 10 -
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funds. Some of the funds could be traced directly to the 
purchase of the automobiles, but the defendant appealed as to 
those funds which were not directly traceable. 
stated: 
This Court 
Such direct tracing of funds is not an 
indispensable requisite to the conclusion 
arrived at. In the nature of the function of 
determining facts it is essential that the 
court or jury have the perogative of finding 
not only facts based upon direct evidence, but 
also those which may be established from the 
reasonable inferences that may be deduced 
therefrom. 
Corporation of Pres. of Ch. of Jesus Christ at 985. 
~he court goes on to show that the circumstances of the 
funds provided a basis from which the trial court could reaso-
nably believe that the money used to purchase the car was 
embezzled. ~he court thus upheld the entire verdict. .Just as 
every dollar need not be traced between the embezzeled funds and 
the purchased autos, likewise, the testimony here need not show a 
direct link between each piece of meat and dollar of damages. 
The reasonable link between those individually inspected and the 
remainder is sufficient. 
That link was drawn when Mr. Ricks testified that he 
made a "general inspection" of the meat and then pulled some 
boxes out of the dump and inspected the meat inside them. The 
next day he made a "full visual inspection" then "went from one 
end of it (the meat) to the other" and "rummaged" through the 
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meat. Mr. Hicks stated he " • • • got down and dug through the 
stuff, and this is where I inspected approximately 150 to 200 
pieces of meat, moving about by hand" and that the cuts he 
inspected were "a cross-section of what was there." {R. 97-98; 
101-102; 116) 
Though this seems the most logical inference to draw, it 
should be noted again that all reasonable minds must reach the 
conclusion that it could not have been a cross-section for the 
verdict to be disturbed. As the court continued in Morris: 
It is my impression that at times any of us 
may be too much inclined to judge what is 
reasonable on the basis of what seems reaso-
nable solely from our own point of view, and 
if it does not coincide with our own conclu-
sion, to deem it unreasonable, rather than to 
allow reasonable latitude as to what other 
reasonable minds may conclude. In order to 
honor the prerogative of the trial court as 
the finder of the facts, it is essential 
that this court should be as objective as 
possible, and keep in mind that the test to be 
applied is not necessarily whether the members 
of the court would reach the same conclusion, 
but whether the findings as made would be 
within the ambit of what any reasonable minds 
might find, even if they should differ from 
our own views. • • • upon the basis of the 
traditional rules which allow the trial court 
the perogative not only of finding the facts 
shown·by direct evidence, but also of drawing 
any reasonable deductions and inferences that 
could fairly and reasonably derive therefrom, 
and which require this court to review the 
total record in the light favorable to his 
findings, we are not persuaded that they are 
so without a reasonable basis in the evidence 
that they should be overturned. 
Morris, supra 507, 508. 
- 12 -
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And so it is with this case. There is no "missing link" 
but only inferences fairly drawn by the jury. 
II. THE LAW ON DAMAGES IN DUAL ACCIDENT CASES. 
The appellant has treated as one issue what is actually 
two. The appellant states "the trial court's decision to 
allow the jury to assess damages for the entire cargo was based 
on the case of Sparks v. Ballenger, 373, S.W.2d. 955, (Mo. 1964)" 
and goes on to discuss two of three cases which the trial court 
considered, but considered for a different purpose . 
. ?\t the trial the question arose as to the amount of 
damages recoverable and who would suffer if the damages could not 
be reasonably apportioned. This case involved an accident and 
fire which damaged the meat, for which Weber County was not 
responsible. 't'he case also involved the negligent action of 
Weber County in handling a food product with front end loaders, 
shovels and dump trucks and thus damaging the same product. !t 
should be remembered that the product was totally salvageable for 
human consumption unless the three-ply plastic container was 
punctured by some means. It was impossible for Mr. Hicks to say 
whether punctures that were existent at the time he inspected the 
meat in the trench came from the initial accident, or the front 
end loader, the dumping, etc. 
The respondent asked the trial court to rule that when 
damages cannot be separated from two causes, and the second cause 
- 13 -
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was by the negligent action of another, that both parties must 
attempt to apportion the damages but if they cannot be separated, 
the defendant will be held responsible for the damages from both 
accidents. This result was reached in Washewich v. LeFave, 248 
So.2d. 670 (Fla.App. 1971), and is based on the reasoning that 
the apportionment problem was caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. 
The trial court in the present case ultimately rejected 
this theory, and since plaintiff could not apportion the damages 
but only prove the amount of damages after ·both incidents, the 
defendant paid only for the meat's value at the dump rather than 
at the accident site. The trial court relied on the two cases 
cited in appellant's brief in refusing to shift the burden of 
proof. Those two cases, Scott v. Rainbow Ambulance Service, Inc. 
452 P.2d 220 (Wa. 1969) and Sparks v. 13allenger, 373 S.W.2d 955 
(Mo. 1964), take a different stance on the dual causation of 
damage issue and state that the defendant cannot be held liable 
for the entire amount of damages but instead the burden of proof 
is lessened for the plaintiff. The plaintiff must show "insofar 
as reasonably possible which of the plaintiff's injuries were 
probably attributable to the first accident and which were 
probably attributable to the second accident. Scott, supra at 
222, (emphasis by the court). The Missouri Supreme Court simi-
larly held that the burden of proof was not shifted to the defen-
- 14 -
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dant but that an instruction should be given to the jury that 
"under such circumstances you may determine the damages, if any, 
from such reasonable inferences as you may find warranted by the 
evidence and all other instructions herein, even though the 
results be only approximate." Sparks, supra at 958. 
~his principle is the basis of respondent's cross-
appeal. Were the case to be remanded for additional proceedings 
on damages, the lower court should be instructed that if the 
damages on the two accidents are not separable, the defendant 
will be responsible for the entire injury. The Washewich court 
stated it this way: 
On the basis of the foregoing authority, it is 
our opinion that where the evidence reveals 
two successive accidents and the defendant is 
only responsible for the second accident, the 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove to the 
extent reasonably possible what injuries were 
proximately caused by each of the two acci-
dents. ~he jury should be instructed to make 
and apportionment of damages as between the 
two accidents insofar as it may be reasonable 
possible to do so, but if an apportionment is 
impossible, the jury may be authorized to 
charge the defendant with all damages flowing 
from the entire injury. Washewich, supra at 
672. 
The reasoning for this position is sound. The Florida Court 
stated: 
The rule £holding the defendant liable for all 
damages if they cannot be apportioned] has as 
its purpose the prevention of the subsequent 
wrongdoer of escaping responsibility where 
his conduct contributed to the creation of the 
situation of the problems of apportionment 
arose. Washewich, supra at 673. 
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That reasoning is even stronger in this case. It is accepted 
that the county was negligent and evident that at least some of 
the damage resulted from that negligence. The percentages Mr. 
Hicks tesified to were at the trench, and the problem of appor-
tioning how much additional damage was done by the county in 
moving the food product with its heavy equipment cannot be deter-
mined. This problem of apportioning was directly caused by the 
county's negligent conduct. The county has all the witnesses and 
without a shift in the burden of proof it has no incentive to 
bring forward possible testimony to clarify the damage issue. 
This encourages the destruction of evidence by a negligent party 
before examination can be made. In a sense this rule is a con-
tinuation of the established rule that a defendant takes the 
plaintiff as he finds him, i.e. if your negligent act injures an 
already ailing plaintiff and makes a separation of damages 
impossible, then you are responsible for the entire damage. 
This, however, is a separate issue than that of the evidence 
sustaining the verdict. It need not be reached since the evi-
dence clearly upholds the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is based on ignoring reasonable inferences 
drawn by the jury and upheld by the trial court. The law is 
clear that the jury has considerable latitude in drawing reaso-
nable, common sense conclusions from the witness' observations. 
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A fair trial was held and appellant is entitled to no more. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 1982. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
By __ ~~~-----------~--~----~ Todd s. Winegar 
Attorneys for Respondent 
- 17 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 
1982, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott Daniels, Esq. 
:r:>aul Droz, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P. o. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
- 18 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
